






























The Impact of Subsidiary Autonomy on MNE Knowledge Transfer: 







SMG WP 16/2008 
 
 
   
   
   
   
   
 April 15, 2008  
   
9
  78-87-91815-12-6 SMG Working Paper No. 16/2008
April 15, 2008 





Center for Strategic Management and Globalization 
Copenhagen Business School 
Porcelænshaven 24 
2000 Frederiksberg  
Denmark 
www.cbs.dk/smg 
The Impact of Subsidiary Autonomy on MNE Knowledge Transfer:  




Copenhagen Business School, Center for Strategic Management and Globalization,  






This paper explores theoretical and empirical ambiguities in the literature concerning the impact of foreign 
subsidiary autonomy on intra-MNE knowledge transfer. We argue that understanding the 
interdependences between subsidiary autonomy and the use of different communication systems – e.g. 
person-based and electronic-based communication systems – is crucial to putting forward new insights in 
the debate. Based on the recent literature on strategic management, we hypothesize that the two 
communication systems call for different degrees of subsidiary autonomy and vice versa. Using a data set 
consisting of 307 dyads between foreign subsidiaries and their parent companies, we find that two 
distinctive configurations positively affect the extent of knowledge transfer from foreign subsidiaries to 
their parent companies. The first is the combination of a high degree of subsidiary autonomy and the use 
of person-based mechanisms, and the second is the combination of low subsidiary autonomy and the use 
of electronic-based mechanisms.  
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Recent research argues that the creation and transfer of knowledge within and between firms is 
likely to significantly influence the value these firms can create and appropriate (Argote and Ingram 2000; 
Grant 1996). Accordingly, multinational enterprises (MNEs) might enjoy the important advantage of 
accessing country- and firm-specific knowledge available in multiple locations (Kogut and Zander 1993). 
As a result, strategic management research concerning the processes through which knowledge is 
transferred within MNEs and factors affecting such transfers has grown dramatically in the last decade 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989; Björkman et al. 2004; Bresman et al. 1999; Chini 2004; Foss and Pedersen 
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2002; Frost 1998; Gupta and Govindarajan 2000; Håkanson and Nobel 2000, 2001; Minbaeva et al. 2003; 
Mudambi 2002; Schulz 2001; Singh 2005; Szulanski 1996; Tsai 2001). In this context, several 
undertakings have emphasized the role of corporate-subsidiary decentralization (i.e. the extent of decision-
making authority that is delegated to the general manager of a subsidiary by corporate superiors) in 
understanding the occurrence of knowledge transfer within the MNE.  However, there seems to be little 
consensus on the effect of corporate-subsidiary decentralization (also called subsidiary autonomy) on 
knowledge transfer within MNEs. In fact, the literature has found everything from a positive to a negative 
effect over no effect at all (Birkinshaw et al. 2002; Foss and Pedersen 2002; Gammelgaard et al. 2004; 
Ghoshal et al. 1994; Lord and Ranft 2000; Tsai 2002). 
The aim of this article is to provide new theoretical and empirical insights into the ambiguity in 
the literature concerning the impact of corporate-subsidiary decentralization on intra-MNE knowledge 
transfer. Specifically, we argue that one of the reasons why the previous findings are not unanimous in this 
regard is due to the fact that the research, as of today, does not relate subsidiary autonomy to the 
communication system utilized within the parent company-subsidiary relationship. The choice of the 
corporate-subsidiary communication system is one of the core dimensions of organizational structure and 
has been recognized to be very relevant in understanding knowledge transfer phenomena within MNEs 
(Almeida et al. 2002; Björkman et al. 2004; Chini 2004; Gupta and Govindarajan 2000; Hansen et al. 
1999; Persaud 2005; Schulz 2001; Tsai 2002). The existing research has not, however, focused on the 
extent to which subsidiary autonomy and different communication mechanisms are interdependent in 
explaining intra-MNE knowledge transfer. Accordingly, in this paper we address this shortcoming by 
analyzing how subsidiary autonomy and the use of two different communication systems — person-based 
and electronic-based systems — depend on each other in affecting the extent of knowledge transfer to the 
parent company. In other words, our overall research question concerns whether knowledge transfer in 
MNEs increases when different degrees of autonomy granted to foreign subsidiaries are coupled with the 
use of distinctive communication systems applied within the parent company-subsidiary relationship. 
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We limit our discussion to the extent of knowledge transfer from foreign subsidiaries to their 
parent companies (sometimes called “reverse knowledge transfer”). Accordingly, the unit of analysis is a 
dyad involving a focal foreign subsidiary and its parent company. Our primary concern in this article is 
the extent to which parent companies acquire and use knowledge from their overseas subsidiaries, with 
knowledge defined as “either expertise (e.g., skills and capabilities) or external market data of strategic 
value.” (Gupta and Govindarajan 1991, p. 773). Finally, within the broad spectrum of all possible types of 
electronically based mechanisms, we focus on communication technologies (e-mail, forum, listservs, etc.), 
knowledge repositories, and portals.  
Literature Review and Theory Development 
The corporate-subsidiary decentralization and the communication system are two very relevant 
organization structure dimensions in the international management literature (see, for example, Ambos 
and Schlegelmilch 2007; Asakawa 2001; Johnston and Menguc 2007; Nobel and Birkinshaw 1998; 
O’Donnell 2000; Taggart and Hood 1999) and these two variables have both been related to the 
occurrence of knowledge transfer within MNEs.  
In research on multinational organizations, corporate-subsidiary decentralization has largely been 
operationalized at the dyadic level of the parent company’s relationship with a specific subsidiary, by 
measuring the relative control exercised by the parent company on the subsidiary in making relevant 
decisions. In other words, it is a measure of subsidiary autonomy (for an exhaustive review of subsidiary 
autonomy in a MNE context, see, Egelhoff 1988; Paterson and Brock 2002; Young and Tavares 2004). 
Previous empirical studies disagree on the effect of subsidiary autonomy on knowledge transfer (Ghoshal 
et al. 1994). Foss and Pedersen (2002) and Tsai (2002) find a positive relationship between subsidiary 
autonomy and knowledge transfer. Other scholars’ evidence suggests that corporate-subsidiary 
decentralization has a positive influence on inter-subsidiary knowledge flows but no effect (Ghoshal et al. 
1994), or even negative impact on the transfer of knowledge from the subsidiaries to the parent companies 
(Gammelgaard et al. 2004). Lord and Ranft (2000) show a negative effect of corporate-subsidiary 
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decentralization on knowledge transfer (cross-divisional), while Birkinshaw et al. (2002) do not find any 
impact of subsidiary autonomy on knowledge transfer. 
Previous literature has highlighted that communication systems are fundamentally of two types: 
person-based and electronic-based (Haas and Hansen 2005; Hansen et al. 1999). The communication 
system is a response to the need to compete in a new international business environment that is 
increasingly complex and competitive. With each foreign subsidiary, the parent company will attempt to 
employ the communication approach that most effectively deals with the diversity of knowledge types and 
activities undertaken by the subsidiary. Accordingly, we might expect that a parent-subsidiary relationship 
will be managed emphasizing one approach more than the other in conformity with the type of the foreign 
subsidiary. A vast bulk of the literature has focused on the impact of formal and informal person-based 
relationships on knowledge transfer (Björkman et al. 2004; Gupta and Govindarajan 2000; Schulz 2001; 
Singh 2005; Tsai 2002). However, empirical consensus also exists on the role played by mechanisms 
based on the electronic media in the international transfer of knowledge (Almeida et al. 2003; Almeida et 
al. 2002; Andersen and Foss 2005). Specifically, electronic communication systems, from telephones and 
electronic mail to more sophisticated systems, such as electronic conferencing, discussion databases, and 
group decision support software, enable communication among managers of different units and the 
sharing of different types of documents (DeSanctis and Fulk 1999; Niederman 2005; Persaud 2005; 
Sambharya et al. 2005). Nevertheless, there is an incomplete understanding of the potentially dissimilar 
roles of intra-MNE knowledge transfer through person-based mechanisms and mechanisms including the 
use of electronic media. 
Although each of the earlier studies has advanced our understanding significantly, they have 
remained largely disconnected. We expect that different degrees of subsidiary autonomy call for more 
emphasis on the use of one communication system than the other. In particular, we consider two 
distinctive configurations that we conjecture will positively impact the extent of reverse knowledge 
transfer. On the one hand, the combination of a high degree of subsidiary autonomy and a greater use of 
person-based mechanisms, and, on the other hand, the combination of a low degree of subsidiary 
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autonomy and a greater use of electronic-based mechanisms. However, it should be noted that we are not 
arguing that an exclusive use of one communication system is beneficial or even desirable. In this article, 
we are neither stressing nor excluding the existence of synergic effects between person-based and 
electronic-based communication systems. Instead, what we argue is that, although both mechanisms may 
co-exist in the parent-subsidiary relationship, in order to increase the extent of reverse knowledge transfer, 
the emphasis on each mechanism should differ according to the managerial choice made on the degree of 
autonomy granted to the foreign subsidiary. In the following, we will look at each of the two 
configurations in turn. 
Person-based Communication, Subsidiary Autonomy, and Knowledge Transfer 
A greater degree of autonomy is often considered positively related with subsidiaries’ knowledge 
creation and development (Ghoshal and Nohria 1989; Gupta and Govindarajan 1991; Nohria and Ghoshal 
1994; Persaud 2005), based on the idea that independent subsidiaries have strategic mandates (Birkinshaw 
et al. 1998) that favor local responsiveness (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989) and knowledge development by 
tapping into local knowledge bases (Andersson et al. 2002; Cantwell 1995). Although opposite results 
have also been found (Brockhoff and Schmaul 1996; Frost et al. 2002), management scholars tend to 
agree on the idea that the autonomy solution enhances the subsidiary’s ability to learn from the local 
system of innovation and allows the MNE to benefit from new knowledge developed by independent 
subsidiaries (Cantwell and Mudambi 2005; Foss and Pedersen 2002; Nobel and Birkinshaw 1998; Taggart 
and Hood 1999).  
Further, when a subsidiary’s ability to create and develop new knowledge increases, it is 
obviously more likely that the subsidiary owns valuable knowledge for the parent company and for the 
MNE as a whole (Cantwell and Mudambi 2005). Nevertheless, the subsidiaries’ ability to create and 
develop new knowledge may have a negative impact on reverse knowledge transfer. First, the creation and 
development of new knowledge by foreign subsidiaries might be based on intensive information exchange 
with local organizations that leads to more context specific and complex knowledge (Andersson et al. 
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2002). Under these conditions, it will be more difficult to apply the subsidiary knowledge in the parent 
company. Second, when subsidiaries are exposed to major internal competition and when knowledge is a 
crucial source of their competitive advantage (Birkinshaw and Hood 1998), subsidiaries may choose to 
make the knowledge they control excludable and they will be prevented from engaging in reverse 
knowledge transfer (Foss and Pedersen 2002; Gupta and Govindarajan 2000). Hence, when a too high 
level of autonomy is granted to the subsidiary, the connections and dependency between the parent 
company and the subsidiary will decrease, and reciprocal trust can be reduced, thus diminishing the 
transfer of knowledge to the other units of the MNE (Forsgren et al. 2000). This is in line with previous 
findings showing a negative impact of subsidiary autonomy on knowledge transfer (Gammelgaard et al. 
2004; Lord and Ranft 2000). 
We argue that overcoming these negative circumstances is possible through the increased use of 
person-based mechanisms. In other words, we expect to observe a positive impact on reverse knowledge 
transfer when a high degree of subsidiary autonomy matches a greater use of person-based mechanisms 
within the parent-subsidiary relationship. Our prediction originates in the results of the previous 
management literature. 
First, it is possible to observe that a motivation mechanism is at work. In fact, it has been observed 
that a higher level of subsidiary autonomy will increase the motivation and the initiatives that a unit can 
take in intra-group knowledge exchange (Tsai 2002). Recent studies argue that employees’ intrinsic 
motivation has a positive effect on knowledge transfer (Bock et al. 2005; Cabrera et al. 2006; Mudambi et 
al. 2007; Osterloh and Frey 2000), while the extrinsic motivational disposition of a source unit to transfer 
its knowledge does not affect intra-MNE knowledge transfer (Gupta and Govindarajan 2000). 
Furthermore, intrinsic motivation fosters participation and personal relationships among employees 
because their perceived self-determination is raised and psychological contracts are established: the so-
called “team spirit” is enabled (Osterloh and Frey 2000). Intrinsic motivation is closely linked to more 
exploratory thinking and greater intellectual challenge (Amabile 1997). Therefore, in organizations that 
adopt person-based mechanisms more strongly, it is more likely that employees exploit their analytic and 
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creative skills by working on unique business problems, and they share complex and tacit knowledge 
(Hansen et al. 1999; Osterloh and Frey 2000). Accordingly, a high corporate-subsidiary decentralization 
that favors individuals’ intrinsic motivation (Mudambi et al. 2007) will match the transfer of complex 
knowledge from subsidiaries to parent companies through person-based mechanisms.  
Second, “once organizations are viewed as institutions for integrating knowledge, a major part of 
which is tacit and can be exercised by those who possess it, then hierarchical coordination fails” (Grant 
1996, p. 118). At the same time, organizations that rely on knowledge that is rich and subtle, i.e. complex, 
are more likely to adopt the ‘personalization’ approach (Hansen et al. 1999) and, accordingly, to base their 
communication system predominantly on person-based mechanisms (Gupta and Govindarajan 2000; Haas 
and Hansen 2005; Pedersen et al. 2003; Persaud 2005). In this context – using patent citation data – Singh 
(2005) finds a greater probability of knowledge flows within a firm when inventors have close 
interpersonal ties. Moreover, recent research on search for innovation emphasizes that the mobility of 
individuals is not only an opportunity to transfer own expertise, but also to facilitate the interpretation of 
this knowledge in a new context (Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003). Thus, from a cognitive perspective, 
when subsidiary knowledge becomes more complex and tacit, the use of richer information transmission 
channels, i.e. person-based mechanisms, will be preferred due to their better capacity of transferring 
complex and tacit knowledge (Daft and Lengel 1986; Gupta and Govindarajan 1991).  
Finally, the socialization models of organizational control discuss the use of training, teamwork 
and other person-based mechanisms to disseminate the mission, goals, values and cultures of 
organizations to workers to transcend their varied interests and align their goals with the values of the 
organization (Johnson and Medcof 2007). On the one hand, the literature seems to disagree on the ultimate 
effect of socialization on foreign subsidiary ability of augmenting its capabilities. For instance, Ambos 
and Reitsperger (2004) find a negative relationship between high socialization and the technical success of 
centers of excellence abroad. However, when other control modes are taken into account, the results show 
that higher levels of socialization combined with lower levels of formalization and centralization 
positively affect subsidiary initiatives to develop and create new knowledge (Nobel and Birkinshaw 
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1998). On the other hand, the impact of socialization on knowledge transfer appears more univocal: shared 
values and identity facilitate meaningful communication that is essential in knowledge transfers (Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal 1998). Nevertheless, Tsai (2002) suggests that the effectiveness of coordination mechanisms 
(e.g. centralization and socialization) on knowledge transfer depends upon the conditions of competition 
among organizational units. Specifically, he argues that, on the one hand, competitive units will react 
negatively (i.e. transfer less knowledge) toward tight control by the headquarter, as they may suspect that 
the headquarter will sacrifice some units’ interests and make decisions in favor of other units. On the other 
hand, more socialization interactions will positively affect knowledge transfer among competing 
organizational units because of their strong incentive to understand what the other competitor units are 
doing. The power-dependence structure within the MNE is also reflected in the autonomy-control tension 
(Asakawa 1996). Specifically, it has been observed that foreign activities need greater autonomy to 
increase their connections with the external research community thereby increasing their own knowledge. 
However, this may induce a lack of balance between internal and external linkages and generate 
autonomy-control tension with the parent company as well as with the other units (Asakawa 2001). In this 
context, higher levels of socialization will stimulate the formation of convergent interests, the sharing of 
beliefs, common values and norms between managers of different units (Tsai and Ghoshal 1998), and, 
therefore, the parent-subsidiary tension will be reduced (Jaeger and Baliga 1985). Accordingly, the 
extensive use of a person-based communication (more than electronic-based communication) in the parent 
company-subsidiary relationship will enhance trust and a shared vision within the MNE, also under 
conditions of internal competition. Thus, also from a socialization/trust perspective, the combination of 
subsidiary autonomy and a higher use of person-based mechanisms will be positively related to the extent 
of reverse knowledge transfer.  
Based on the above considerations, the following hypothesis is formulated:  
HYPOTHESIS 1. A higher degree of subsidiary autonomy applied together with a higher use of person-
based communication increases the extent of reverse knowledge transfer.  
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Electronic-based Communication, Subsidiary Autonomy, and Knowledge Transfer  
Information systems are designed to support and augment organizational knowledge management 
and need to complement and enhance the communication ability of the firm (Alavi and Leidner 2001). 
While not all knowledge management strategies – in particular person-based strategies – involve a wide 
implementation of information and communication technology (ICT), many knowledge management 
initiatives rely on ICT as an important enabler (Haas and Hansen 2005). In the introduction, we clarified 
that we focus on a specific group of electronic-based mechanisms; specifically, communication 
technologies (e-mail, forum, chat, etc.), knowledge repositories, and portals, i.e. ‘exploitation 
mechanisms’ (Kane and Alavi 2007). In the following, we will use the terms “electronic-based 
mechanisms” and “exploitation mechanisms” as synonyms. 
As mentioned above, empirical consensus exists on the role played by electronic-based 
mechanisms in intra-MNE knowledge transfer. In particular, electronic tools are effective for transferring 
standard data and well understood messages and information, while their limitations are revealed when 
less codified knowledge has to be transferred (Daft and Lengel 1986; Pedersen et al. 2003). Indeed, the 
adoption of exploitation mechanisms requires firms to develop ‘knowledge objects’ (Hansen et al. 1999; 
Zack 1999), that is, knowledge that can be viewed as a thing to be stored and manipulated. Such 
knowledge is collected mostly in databases, reports, or handbooks through a “people-to-documents” 
process, and it can be accessed and used relatively easily by anyone in the company (among others see, 
Hansen et al. 1999; Zollo and Winter 2002). Accordingly, the effective transfer of tacit knowledge 
through electronic-based mechanisms will also be possible in many cases, but only after the application of 
a specific codification strategy that involves the transformation of tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge 
(Schulz and Jobe 2001). Therefore, the use of multiple electronic-based mechanisms dispersed across 
distance, time, and cultures, can lead to the spreading of diverse and incompatible codification/people-to-
document processes within the MNE (Rao et al. 2007), giving rise to no or inefficient reverse knowledge 
transfer. In fact, in this case, we would observe increasing costs of transferring knowledge within the 
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MNE due to differences in coding methods, languages, understanding of phenomena and context, etc., and 
lower compatibility of internet instruments across borders. 
We argue, however, that overcoming these inefficiencies is possible through the reduction of 
subsidiary autonomy. More precisely, we expect to observe a positive impact on reverse knowledge 
transfer when a low degree of subsidiary autonomy is combined with a greater use of electronic-based 
mechanisms within the parent-subsidiary relationship. The argument runs as follows. Common standards, 
languages, procedures, and routines, and global infrastructures will play a crucial role in MNEs that rely 
more extensively on electronic-based communication and, therefore, need to share codification strategies 
among the different units. Only if standardization, communalities, and compatible ICT systems are well 
spread and maintained over some time horizon among the units, will MNEs be able to achieve efficient 
knowledge transfer when using electronic-based communication. The management information systems 
literature has suggested that a decentralized MNE will be more likely to pursue independent ICT 
operations in each subsidiary (Jarvenpaa and Ives 1993). A high level of corporate standards may, 
moreover, be perceived as intrusive from local managers with a high degree of autonomy in decision 
making (Karimi and Konsynski 1991). On the other hand, in centrally coordinated MNEs, ICT systems 
are also usually globally centralized (King and Sethi 1999). Centralized electronic databases are effective 
for collecting rationalized knowledge (Weiss 1998). In fact, codification strategies involve considerable 
costs of creating and maintaining repositories of organizational knowledge (Hansen et al. 1999; Schulz 
and Jobe 2001). To make sure that the codification process works efficiently, organizations have to invest 
a lot to create an integrate electronic repository, have comparable formats, and design a customized and 
common taxonomy (Weiss et al. 2004). An advantage of centralization is that it allows MNEs to avoid 
having multiple divisions or groups within the MNE create their own unintegrated intranet portals or data 
warehouses and the like. When information architectures vary across systems as well as formats, 
employees are unable to browse contents easily and efficiently. A central player can ensure consistency of 
formats and standards can be institutionalized more broadly across the organization (Karimi and 
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Konsynski 1991). Common attributes, coding schemes, and values across databases are necessary for 
economizing data sharing (Goodhue et al. 1988).  
Much recent literature has shown that exploitation mechanisms reduce knowledge heterogeneity 
and promote exploitation learning (Kane and Alavi 2007), such as incremental learning focused on 
refinement, and reuse of existing knowledge (March 1991). It has also been observed that organizations 
that experience minor environmental turbulence will benefit from exploitation mechanisms (Kane and 
Alavi 2007), while organizations might abstain from codifying their knowledge if the costs of the process 
exceed the benefits. Accordingly, emphasizing greater use of electronic-based mechanisms – within the 
parent-subsidiary relationship – combined with a highly decentralized and competence-creating subsidiary 
(Cantwell and Mudambi 2005), which generally faces complex knowledge and more a turbulent 
environment, is likely to be inefficient. On the other hand, the transfer of knowledge from subsidiaries to 
parent companies through electronic-based mechanisms, will be greater under conditions of low 
subsidiary autonomy where subsidiaries are expected to face environments of relatively low complexity 
(Ghoshal and Nohria 1989) and where their knowledge is mainly explicit or codifiable in a cost-efficient 
manner (Schulz and Jobe 2001).  
Based on these arguments, we suggest the following hypothesis:  
HYPOTHESIS 2. A lower degree of subsidiary autonomy applied together with a higher use of electronic-
based communication increases the extent of reverse knowledge transfer.  
 
Methodology 
Sample and Data Collection 
As our study concerns the impact of the organizational structure on the extent of knowledge transfer from 
a focal foreign subsidiary to its parent company, we consider the dyad of a focal foreign subsidiary and its 
parent company as the unit of analysis. Using this dyadic approach, we created a dataset of 307 
observations.  
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Our sample selection was guided by the following criteria. First, we generated the sample frame 
from the Reprint database (Mariotti and Mutinelli 2005), which contains census data on the foreign 
activities of the Italian firms as of the beginning of 2004. Second, we limited the sample frame to the 
population of all Italian MNEs with more than 50 employees, operating in manufacturing industries, and 
with at least one majority-owned subsidiary located in advanced countries and involved in “primary 
upstream activities” such as R&D and manufacturing. The final sample frame consists of a total of 358 
Italian MNEs, out of which 84 were studied through on-site face-to-face structured interviews with the 
parent company’s top managers (response rate of about 24 percent). Five of these MNEs also served as 
sites for the pre-testing and refinement of the questionnaire.  
Data collection took place from December 2004 to July 2005 and involved six researchers. All 
parent companies’ top managers were contacted by phone and asked for a face-to-face interview. At the 
same time a personalized letter with a description of the project and assurances regarding the 
confidentiality of collected data was sent to them. The interviews ranged from one to three hours in 
length; however, for most of the parent companies with more then five subsidiaries (20% of the sample), 
we were able to obtain longer interviews, sometimes based on two-day meetings. For each of the 84 
MNEs we collected data regarding the dyadic relationships of the parent company with each of its 
majority-owned foreign subsidiaries involved in manufacturing or R&D activities. 
 
Measures 
Reverse Knowledge Transfer 
 
Following Gupta and Govindarajan (1991), we define knowledge flows as the transfer of either skills and 
capabilities (i.e. expertise) or external market information of strategic value, such as globally relevant 
information about key customers, competitors, or suppliers, from the foreign subsidiary to its parent 
company. Using open questions, informants were first asked to provide descriptions on the subsidiary’s 
expertise regarding products, technologies, and primary activities (Schulz 2001). Next, structured 
questions were posed, focusing on whether the identified subsidiary’s knowledge pertaining to the above 
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three domains was transferred to, and used by, the parent company. Examples of these questions are: has 
the subsidiary’s technology that you described been transferred to and used by the parent company? Have 
the specific subsidiary’s competences that you described been transferred to and used by the parent 
company? Finally, the respondents were asked to indicate the intensity of the knowledge transfer from the 
subsidiary to the parent company (‘null’, 0; “low,” 1; “medium,” 2; “high,” 3). Based on this last answer, 
we define the dependent variable reverse knowledge transfer, ranging from 0 (no transfer at all), to 3 (high 
transfer). Therefore, transfers were assessed from the receiving unit’s perspective, i.e. the parent company. 
In line with Lord and Ranft (2000, p. 582), “this was done primarily because to try to measure knowledge 
transfer from the sender’s perspective is inherently problematic – e.g., knowledge that is ‘sent’ is not 
always ‘received’ (Szulanski 1996).” 
Subsidiary Autonomy 
The measure of corporate-subsidiary decentralization is essentially based on questions originally 
developed by Ghoshal and Nohria (1989). Specifically, we know at which MNE level each of the 
following four firm's strategic decisions are taken: (i) definition of R&D projects, planning, resources, 
etc.; (ii) introduction of new technologies; (iii) changes in products/services; and (iv) hiring and firing of 
the subsidiary management. The following scale was used: (1) ‘the parent company decides alone’; (2) 
‘the parent company decides but considers subsidiary inputs’; (3) ‘both parent company and subsidiary 
have roughly equal influence on decisions’; (4) ‘the subsidiary decides, but considers parent company 
suggestions’; and (5) ‘the subsidiary decides alone’ (Ghoshal et al. 1994; Ghoshal and Nohria 1989). The 
final measure of subsidiary autonomy is the average of responses to the four items (Cronbach’s alpha =  
0.74). 
Person and Electronic Based Communication Systems 
Inter-unit trips and visits, international committees, teams, task forces, and training involving participants 
from multiple units have been found to facilitate MNE integration and favor knowledge transfer 
(Björkman et al. 2004; Bresman et al. 1999; Chini 2004; Ghoshal et al. 1994; Gupta and Govindarajan 
2000; Håkanson and Nobel 2001; Hansen 1999; Nobel and Birkinshaw 1998; Schulz 2001; Tsai 2001; 
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2002). To capture parent-subsidiary communication based on personal ties we focus on teamwork 
involving people from both the foreign subsidiary and the parent company, and the temporary (short-term) 
transfer of managers and/or scientific and technical staff (researchers, engineers, etc.) within the parent-
subsidiary dyad. As regards short-term transfer, the respondents were asked to consider the movement of 
people other than people visiting for only one or a few days or expatriates. Respondents were asked to 
assess the intensity of the use of the three person-based mechanisms on a 7-point Likert scale, from ‘used 
rarely’ to ‘used very often’. The final measure of person-based is the average of responses to the three 
items (Cronbach alpha =  0.72). 
We capture electronic based communication by the intensity of the use of internet instruments, 
such as forums, newsletters, e-mails, instant messages, etc., and the sharing of documents like handbooks, 
blueprints, databases, in the parent-subsidiary relationship (Pedersen et al. 2003; Persaud 2005). Based on 
a 7-point Likert scale, from ‘used rarely’ to ‘used very often’, the final measure of electronic-based is the 
average of responses to the two items (Cronbach’s alpha =  0.60).1 
Interaction Effects 
To capture the combined effect of using a specific communication system under different degrees of 
subsidiary autonomy, we follow previous works (Birkinshaw et al. 2002; Schoonhoven 1981) in 
constructing interaction terms between both the two communication systems and the decision making 
variable. Specifically, we add to the model the following variables: person-based×subsidiary autonomy 
and electronic-based×subsidiary autonomy. In order to support our hypotheses, we expect a positive and a 
negative effect on the extent of reverse knowledge transfer, respectively. 
Control Variables  
                                                 
1 Although the value of 0.7 is often used as a guide for Cronbach’s Alpha, Nunnally (1967) recommends a value 
equal to or greater than 0.60 as the minimum for research purposes. While our results concerning electronic-based 
communication have to be taken with the necessary caution, we contend that this does not undermine them since key 
variables with similar values of Cronbach’s Alpha have been used successfully in previous knowledge-transfer-
related research (among others, see Schulz 2001; Szulanski 1996). 
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- Subsidiary mandate. Previous literature has linked our organizational structure dimensions with the 
strategic subsidiary mandate (Ambos and Schlegelmilch 2007; Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989; Ghoshal and 
Nohria 1989; Gupta and Govindarajan 1991; Nobel and Birkinshaw 1998). There is a recent but now well 
established literature on the diversity of subsidiary roles within an MNE. Some of the subsidiaries within 
the MNE network may crucially depend on the competence of their parent companies, so that their role is 
competence-exploiting (Cantwell and Mudambi 2005), either as a local implementer (Gupta and 
Govindarajan 1991), or as an assembler (Cantwell 1987); others take on a more creative function (Pearce 
1999) as integrated players (Gupta and Govindarajan 1991) or as centers of excellence (Holm and 
Pedersen 2000). 
Studies have utilized a series of different approaches to operationalized subsidiary typologies. We 
adopt the implementation of this variable from Ghoshal (1986), distinguishing among ‘implementer 
subsidiary’, ‘contributor subsidiary’, and ‘innovator subsidiary’. We also follow Nobel and Birkinshaw 
(1998) and Ambos and Schlegelmilch (2007) and apply a rather simple heuristic based on the nature of the 
subsidiary activities. The respondents were asked to indicate whether the focal foreign subsidiary was 
devoted to ‘capability-augmenting’ or ‘capability-exploiting’ activities. The former group’s activities are 
undertaken to create new products and/or new technologies whereas the latter group focuses on activities 
directed towards significant and/or marginal product/process improvements. Those subsidiaries that are 
neither capability-augmenting nor capability-exploiting are called Implementers, those that are only 
capability-exploiting are Contributors, while those that are capability-augmenting are labeled Innovators.  
- Entry mode. Although acquisitions and joint ventures have traditionally been seen as a common way for 
the MNE to access local competencies and skills (Bresman et al. 1999; Kogut and Zander 1993; Lane et 
al. 2001; Simonin 1999), empirical studies also found that the incidence of technology transfer from 
subsidiaries to parent companies is higher for greenfield subsidiaries than for acquisitions (Frost 1998; 
Zhou 2002). Therefore, in order to capture the effects of the entry mode on reverse knowledge transfer, we 
add to the model the dummy variable greenfield. 
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- Cultural distance. Cultural distance is measured utilizing Kogut and Singh’s (1988) cultural distance 
index (among the others that have previously adopted this measure, see for instance Ambos et al. 2006; 
Håkanson and Nobel 2001). 
- Industry. As foreign subsidiaries operating in different industries face different technological 
opportunities to enhance knowledge creation and development, we control for the industry. We define the 
dummy high-tech that equals one if the subsidiary operates either in science-based or specialized suppliers 
sectors (Pavitt 1984). 
- Parent company absorptive capacity. This variable is based on parent companies’ balance sheet data in 
2004, and it aims to control for the existence of prior knowledge in the parent company. This knowledge 
is expected to facilitate the understanding of possible incoming knowledge from the subsidiary. The 
variable is defined as the ratio of parent intangible assets (in millions of Euros) and the number of 
employees of the parent company. 
Testing for Response Bias 
To assess non-response bias, we tested whether responding MNEs differ from non-responding MNEs with 
respect to size (class of number of employees) and sector. The tests indicate that low-tech sectors are 
underrepresented (p<0.001) in our sample (see Table 1). Accordingly, the generalization of our results 
concerning low-tech industries must be taken with the necessary caution. However, it should be noted that 
previous findings suggest that firms in low-tech sectors have a much lower tendency to engage in reverse 
knowledge transfer from their subsidiaries, since foreign technology is generally obtained from outside the 
firm’s boundaries (Brusoni et al. 2001). This is in line with the information put together during the data 
collection process: most of the MNEs investing abroad in low-tech sectors declared that they do not 
consider the possibility to transfer back knowledge from their subsidiaries an important issue. That has 
curbed their interest in participating in the project. 
– INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE – 
The use of perceptual measures introduces the risk of common method bias. To assess common 
method bias in our sample, we performed the Harman's single-factor test (Harman 1967; Podsakoff and 
 16
Organ 1986) on items included in our econometric model. The factor analysis reveals six factors with 
eigenvalues greater than one, the first of which (eigenvalue = 3.17) explains 19.82% of the variance. This 
result indicates that common method bias is not a serious problem. 
To rule out possible one-respondent bias, we performed validity response tests on our dependent 
and independent variables based on perceptual data. In fact, for 62 dyads we were able to collect relevant 
information from both the parent company’s manager and the subsidiaries’ top manager. Therefore, we 
present the Kruskal-Wallis equality of populations rank test that tests the hypothesis that two (or more) 
samples are from the same population (Brett et al. 1995; Downey et al. 1975). In general, the validity tests 
confirm that the responses from managers at the parent company and at the subsidiary regarding our 
dependent and independent variables are not significantly different (see Table 2). The only exception 
concerns the items “temporary transfer of managers” and “temporary transfer of professionals”. 
Specifically, the parent companies perceive a greater number of personnel transfers with their subsidiaries 
than the foreign subsidiaries perceive. However, this difference is to be expected. Although personnel 
transfers may be one-way or two-way (from the parent company to the subsidiary and vice-versa), we 
know from the interviews that it is mostly a uni-directional movement (from the parent to the subsidiary). 
Also taking into account that the diffusion of this work practice in the MNE is usually encouraged and 
formalized by the parent company, it is not surprising that the foreign subsidiaries report using smaller 
numbers of personnel transfers than their parent companies.  
– INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE – 
Results and Discussion 
The summary of the descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables in this study are reported in 
Table 3. No variables exhibit distribution or correlation problems. Given the ordinal nature of our 
dependent variable, we estimate ordered probit models. Results from the econometric estimations are 
reported in Table 4, while the relevant marginal effects are reported in Table 5. We standardized the 
independent variables by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation, in order to avoid 
 17
high correlation between these variables and their interaction terms (Neter et al. 1990). The dyadic 
approach raises an issue of possible non-independence among the observations (Greene 2000). Therefore, 
using the Stata’s cluster option we obtain a robust variance estimate that adjusts for within-cluster 
correlation (Froot 1989; Williams 2000)). In this way we are able to control for the fact that observations 
(i.e., dyads) belonging to the same MNE are possibly not independent. Three models are presented in 
Table 4. In Model 1, we enter only the control variables, in Model 2 we add the independent variables, and 
in Model 3 we insert the interaction terms for testing our hypotheses. 
– INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE – 
 With respect to the control variables, it is worth observing that in line with the theory, our 
estimations reveal that contributor and innovator subsidiaries are more likely to transfer knowledge to 
their parent companies than implementer subsidiaries (i.e. the benchmark).  
Turning to the independent variables, our results show that both communication systems are 
positively related to reverse knowledge transfer. In Model 2, the variable person-based shows a positive 
and significant coefficient (p<0.01) indicating that the circulation of staff internationally generates a 
greater degree of reverse knowledge transfer. An extensive use of face-to-face mechanisms maximizes the 
level of interaction with employees of the parent and the subsidiary, offering the greatest opportunity to 
transfer knowledge through the grafting of individuals with special expertise. An extensive use of 
exploitation mechanisms also enhances reverse knowledge transfer, since the coefficient of electronic-
based mechanisms is positive and significant at p<0.1. When we add the interaction terms to the model 
(Model 3), it can be observed that the coefficients of person-based and electronic-based continue to be 
positive and significant (p<0.01 and p<0.05, respectively). These results are in line with the previous 
literature on knowledge transfer that suggests both types of communication systems as effective channels 
for transferring knowledge. However, based on the idea that the right combination of interdependent 
dimensions should lead to superior performance, we expect that a greater emphasis on one of the two 
possible communication systems will be associated with a higher degree of reverse knowledge transfer 
under different subsidiary autonomy conditions. This interdependence between corporate-subsidiary 
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decentralization and communication systems is also apparent when the coefficient for subsidiary 
autonomy is examined; it is not significant in Model 2 but significant in Model 3, where we control for 
different communication systems that we expect to interact with the degree of subsidiary autonomy.  
– INSERT TABLES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE – 
With respect to our hypotheses, the coefficients of the interaction terms person-based×subsidiary 
autonomy and electronic-based×subsidiary autonomy are significant and have the right sign, positive and 
negative, respectively. These findings are well in line with our theoretical predictions, thus supporting 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. Our results confirm that the interdependence among organizational structure 
dimensions, specifically subsidiary autonomy and communication systems, should be considered an 
important contingency affecting effective reverse knowledge transfer. Based on the results of the recent 
research in strategic management, we expect – and our estimations confirm  – that increasing levels of 
subsidiary autonomy with an increased use of person-based communication will lead to higher levels of 
reverse knowledge transfer, while increased use of electronic-based media should be coupled with 
decreasing levels of subsidiary autonomy and should hence lead to higher levels of reverse knowledge 
transfer.  
  The negative effect of the interaction of electronic mechanisms with subsidiary autonomy can be 
said to give support to the information processing theory advanced by Egelhoff (1988), since the theory 
suggests that “information processing” works better when centralization dominates, and given that 
electronic media may be considered carriers of “information” in the Egelhoff sense of the word. 
Centralization helps to reduce costs that include redundancies, incompatibility, lack of common 
understanding and standards, whose existence is expected to decrease the effectiveness of the use of the 
exploitation mechanisms (i.e. communication technologies such as e-mail, forum, listservs, etc., 
knowledge repositories, and portals). In addition, when subsidiary autonomy increases differences among 
parent and subsidiary ‘knowledge structures’, which may include knowledge domain, terminology, 
interpretation of phenomena and social context, are expected to increase, giving rise to misunderstandings 
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between senders and receivers, limiting codification strategies and the electronic media impact on reverse 
knowledge transfer.  
Considering rich communication media, we know – as the literature suggests – that they are costly 
to maintain (Daft and Lengel 1986; Pedersen et al. 2003) due to travel costs, availability of time, and 
differences in cultures and language; therefore, their extensive use should be justified. Accordingly, a 
contingency perspective is warranted. That is to say, effective management of knowledge transfer from 
high autonomous subsidiaries – expected to be more innovative and to own complex and context specific 
knowledge (Cantwell and Mudambi 2005; Gupta and Govindarajan 1991) – requires the use of richer 
communication mechanisms (Daft and Lengel 1986), and parent companies will be willing “to pay” 
because of the expected positive influence on the costs and benefit trade-off in such transfer processes. 
Whereas managers will face several difficulties in transferring context and tacit knowledge across 
countries through exploiting mechanisms (Persaud 2005), significant investments in ICTs for supporting 
electronic-based communication may be not justified if the people-to-documents process cannot be 
pursued in an economic way or too much knowledge is lost during the transfer.  
Additional Analysis 
It is crucial to clarify that in non-linear models, such as ordered probit models, the impact of the 
interaction term on the dependent variable is “a function of not only the coefficient for the interaction, but 
also the coefficients for each interacted variables and the values of all the variables.” (Hoetker 2007, p. 
336). More unexpectedly, the sign of the effect of the interaction may be different for different 
observations, and the statistical significance cannot be determined from the z-statistic reported in the 
regression output (Norton et al. 2004). To date, unfortunately, no procedure dealing with interaction terms 
for ordered probit models has been developed. However, Ai and Norton (2003) have proposed a procedure 
that computes correct magnitudes and standard errors of interaction effects in logit and probit models (this 
procedure has been implemented in STATA through the inteff module). Accordingly, in order to deal with 
this complication – unreliability of interaction terms in non-linear models – we opted for a conservative 
choice, running a probit estimation of Model 3, applying the Ai and Norton’s (2003) procedure (see also, 
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Norton et al. 2004). We transformed our dependent variable into a binary variable by collapsing all the 
observations with reverse knowledge transfer equal to 1, 2, or 3 to the value of 1. We are aware that this 
operation removes a great deal of the variance in our model, but we also think that this conservative 
choice is crucial in order to provide an appropriate and complete interpretation of our findings.  
Based on results from Model 6 (Table 6), the graphs in Figure 1 compare the interaction effect 
calculated by the conventional linear method with the interaction effect calculated by the method 
suggested by Norton et al. (2004) against predicted probabilities of reverse knowledge transfer equal to 
one. The graphs in Figure 2 plot the statistical significance of the interaction effect against predicted 
probabilities of reverse knowledge transfer equal to one.  
– INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE – 
Considering person-based communication, Figure 1(a) illustrates that the strongest interaction 
effect occurs at medium predicted levels of probability of reverse knowledge transfer (approximately 
between 0.2 and 0.6), whereas the effect is less pronounced for low and high levels of predicted 
probability of reverse knowledge transfer. In Figure 1(b), a similar path is observable for electronic-based 
mechanisms where the strongest interaction effect occurs approximately between 0.2 and 0.8 of the 
predicted levels of probability of reverse knowledge transfer. Figure 2(a) illustrates that the interaction 
effect of subsidiary autonomy and person-based mechanisms is positive and significant in the majority of 
cases within the 0.2-0.6 interval of the predicted probability (80.7% of the observations are significant at 
the two-tailed ten percent level), while Figure 2(b) shows that the interaction term of subsidiary autonomy 
and electronic-based communication is negative, but also significant in the majority of cases within the 
0.2-0.8 interval of the predicted probability (83.8% of the observations are significant at the two-tailed ten 
percent level). These results are in line with the findings from the ordered probit estimation and they offer 
evidence of the positive role on reverse knowledge transfer played by the use of person-based 
communication under conditions of high subsidiary autonomy. Likewise, they provide support for the 
result that under conditions of low subsidiary autonomy, the emphasis should be on electronic-based 
communication. 
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– INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE – 
Conclusion 
This work has sought to make a contribution to the ongoing debate of the impact of subsidiary autonomy 
on intra-MNE knowledge transfer. The key contribution to the strategic management literature was to 
identify and examine the implications of the interaction effects between the corporate-subsidiary 
decentralization and the use of different communication systems, i.e. person-based and electronic-based 
systems, as an important feature of the intra-MNE knowledge transfer. While the relevance of both 
subsidiary autonomy and communication systems in knowledge transfer processes within MNEs has been 
acknowledged before, they have typically been treated as independent dimensions. This has led to 
conflicting results of the impact of subsidiary autonomy on knowledge transfer. In this study we have 
argued and empirically substantiated that to resolve the ambiguity in the literature regarding the effect of 
the subsidiary autonomy on knowledge transfer it is crucial to consider which communication system is 
emphasized within the parent-subsidiary relationship. Specifically, we considered two distinctive 
configurations of interdependence: the combination of a high degree of subsidiary autonomy and the use 
of person-based mechanisms, and the combination of a low degree of subsidiary autonomy and the use of 
electronic-based mechanisms.  
This study also offers potentially important implications for parent companies’ managers. In fact, 
not all firms are equally capable of transferring knowledge inside the MNE, in particular, the managerial 
choice of how to set the organizational structure variables is one that most directly reflects how to 
facilitate or inhibit knowledge transfer. Thus, although all the potential obstacles that parent companies’ 
managers may face in pursuing knowledge transfer within the multinational network cannot be addressed, 
our results suggest actions and provide guidance for managers. By identifying the combination of the 
corporate-subsidiary decentralization and communication systems that enhances the extent of reverse 
knowledge transfer, the primary practical implication is that parent companies can employ organizational 
structure dimensions as a strategic choice for affecting effective reverse knowledge transfer. In line with 
previous findings, the empirical analyses showed that both person-based and electronic-based 
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communication systems are mechanisms able to affect positively the extent of reverse knowledge transfer. 
However, the study suggests that different communication mechanisms should be emphasized according 
to the degree of autonomy granted to the foreign subsidiary. Specifically, parent companies’ managers can 
increase the probability of observing reverse knowledge transfer, giving more autonomy to the 
subsidiaries. However, they should consider that this decentralization is expected to reduce the 
effectiveness of electronic-based media within the MNE. 
The limitations of this study should also be noted. Of course, the context of the study – reverse 
knowledge transfer within Italian MNEs – was specific; therefore, it imposes limits on the generalizability 
of our results to other national samples. Nevertheless, the findings suggest that it is worth examining the 
interdependence among organizational structure dimensions that could be chosen to influence the transfer 
of knowledge from foreign subsidiaries to their parent companies. As we used perceptual data from a 
single respondent at the parent company level, albeit with some validity checks at the subsidiary level, we 
may still have some common-method bias. In this case, the availability of secondary and/or objective data 
about concepts like subsidiary autonomy, inter-unit communication type, knowledge transfer, would be a 
valuable source for additional insights. Moreover, we were able to define valid measures for three specific 
organization structure dimensions: the corporate-subsidiary decentralization, person-based and electronic-
based communication systems. Further studies might gain additional understanding by searching for 
additional organizational controls. Research in information systems, for example, considers electronic 
communities of practice an important mechanism for transferring and sharing knowledge. Finally, this 
study analyzed reverse knowledge transfer at the dyadic level. However, a more comprehensive 
understanding of the hypothesized relationships could be gained by analyzing all the possible knowledge 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1 – The size effect of the interactions between subsidiary autonomy and person- and electronic- 
based communication systems 

















Figure 2 – The significance of the interactions between subsidiary autonomy and person- and electronic- 
based communication  
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The two horizontal lines represent the z-statistic at ±1.64. All the observations above +1.64 and below –1.64 are 









Table 1 – Sample’s representativeness 
  Sample frame Non Respondent Respondent χ2 test 
Industry        
High-tech sectors a 109 71 38 0.0008*** 
Size     
50 – 249 98 80 18  0.1624 
250 – 499 81 66 15  0.2325 
500 – 5000 145 102 43  0.0225** 
> 5000 34 26 8  0.9924 
a 249 MNEs belong to the low-tech sector of which 203 were non respondent.  
* p< .10;   ** p< .05;  *** p< .01 
 
Table 2 – Validity response tests 
 Observationsa Kruskal-Wallis test P_valueb 
Dependent variable    
Degree of reverse knowledge transfer 62 1.250 0.264 
Independent variables    
Teamwork 59 1.988 0.159 
Temporary transfer of managers 55 26.988       0.000*** 
Temporary transfer of professionals 55 23.554       0.000*** 
Exchange of blueprints, db, etc.  57 0.015 0.904 
Internet tools 56 1.621 0.203 
a Number of parent company-foreign subsidiary dyads available.  
b Rejecting the null hypothesis means that the two distributions – the answers from the parent companies and the 
answers from the subsidiaries – are different. 
* p< .10;   ** p< .05;  *** p< .01 
 
 
Table 3 – Descriptive statistics 
Variable a Means S.d. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) Reverse knowledge transfer 0.580 0.988         
(2) Contributor  0.160 0.367 0.222        
(3) Innovator 0.306 0.462 0.190 -0.290       
(4) Greenfield  0.316 0.466 0.041 0.086 -0.117      
(5) Cultural distance 1.227 0.954 -0.075 -0.009 -0.192 0.052     
(6) High-tech 0.407 0.492 0.010 0.019 0.097 0.107 -0.015    
(7) Parent company absorptive capacity 0.023 0.067 0.275 0.266 -0.083 -0.003 0.061 -0.136   
(8) Subsidiary autonomy a 2.482 0.774 0.069 -0.088 0.278 0.050 -0.115 0.058 -0.041  
(9) Person-based a 3.160 1.781 0.292 0.073 -0.152 0.051 0.142 -0.152 0.320 -0.314 
(10) Electronic-based a 4.516 2.110 0.192 0.018 -0.005 0.196 0.059 0.238 0.160 0.005 0.210
a The variable is standardized. The table lists the means, standard deviations, and correlations of these variables prior 
to the standardization. 
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Table 4 – Results of the ordered probit regressions for reverse knowledge transfer 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Contributor  0.821 (0.367)** 1.101 (0.389)*** 1.107 (0.379)*** 
Innovator 0.847 (0.235)*** 0.991 (0.213)*** 0.894 (0.231)*** 
Greenfield  0.243 (0.289) 0.061 (0.205) 0.028 (0.207) 
Cultural distance -0.025 (0.110) -0.116 (0.089) -0.115 (0.090) 
High-tech -0.129 (0.245) -0.175 (0.247) -0.175 (0.243) 
Parent company absorptive capacity 3.920 (2.206)* 1.555 (2.087) 1.428 (2.022) 
Subsidiary autonomy  0.184 (0.140) 0.320 (0.156)** 
Person-based  0.242 (0.086)*** 0.248 (0.080)*** 
Electronic-based  0.121 (0.065)* 0.128 (0.063)** 
Person-based ×Subsidiary autonomy   0.198 (0.079)** 
Electronic-based ×Subsidiary autonomy     -0.176 (0.066)*** 
Log-pseudolikelihood –263.88 –242.88 –235.58 
Wald χ2 20.64*** 45.10*** 62.11*** 
McFadden's Adjusted Pseudo-R2 0.087 0.156 0.182 
In brackets, robust standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and cluster-correlated data.  
* p< .10;  ** p< .05; *** p< .01 (two-tailed tests applied). 
 
Table 5 – Marginal effects of independent variables on reverse knowledge transfer (RKT) 
Variable a RKT=0 RKT=1 RKT=2 RKT=3
Contributor  -0.402 0.074 0.169 0.160
Innovator -0.305 0.077 0.134 0.094
Greenfield  -0.009 0.003 0.004 0.002
Cultural distance 0.036 -0.012 -0.016 -0.008
High-tech 0.055 -0.018 -0.024 -0.013
Parent company absorptive capacity -0.451 0.144 0.201 0.105
Subsidiary autonomy -0.101 0.032 0.045 0.024
Person-based -0.078 0.025 0.035 0.018
Electronic-based -0.040 0.013 0.018 0.009
Person-based ×Subsidiary autonomy -0.062 0.020 0.028 0.015
Electronic-based ×Subsidiary autonomy 0.056 -0.018 -0.025 -0.013
a Marginal effect for dummy variable is calculated by comparing the probabilities that result when the variable takes 
its two different values with those that occur with the other variables held at their sample means (see, for details, 
Greene 2000). 
 
Table 6 – Results of the probit regressions for reverse knowledge transfer 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Constant -0.939 (0.245)*** -0.824 (0.240)*** -0.721 (0.252)***
Contributor 0.694 (0.414)* 0.913 (0.426)** 0.904 (0.414)**
Innovator 0.782 (0.263)*** 0.931 (0.241)*** 0.819 (0.255)***
Greenfield  0.366 (0.341) 0.206 (0.251) 0.185 (0.255)
Cultural distance -0.022 (0.142) -0.105 (0.108) -0.108 (0.109)
High-tech -0.319 (0.280) -0.426 (0.284) -0.445 (0.283)
Parent company absorptive capacity 2.123 (1.860) -0.487 (1.924) -0.651 (1.846)
Subsidiary autonomy 0.113 (0.143) 0.262 (0.168)
Person-based 0.231 (0.099)** 0.238 (0.095)**
Electronic-based 0.145 (0.071)** 0.143 (0.070)**
Person-based ×Subsidiary autonomy 0.167 (0.085)*
Electronic-based ×Subsidiary autonomy  -0.157 (0.071)**
Log-pseudolikelihood -171.74 -151.92 -147.26
Wald χ2 18.15*** 34.35*** 42.17***
McFadden's Adjusted Pseudo-R2 0.089 0.190 0.214
 In brackets, robust standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and cluster-correlated data.  
* p< .10;  ** p< .05; *** p< .01 (two-tailed tests applied). 
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